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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Culley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his 
guilty plea to second degree murder. Culley contends the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and in imposing 
sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Culley on three charges: (1) first degree murder for his 
involvement in the murder of his aunt, Elizabeth Baune, which murder occurred 
during the course of a "robbery and/or burglary"; (2) grand theft; and (3) burglary. 
(R., pp.27-28, 95-96.) Elizabeth died from multiple stab wounds to her chest and 
head; she was "stabbed a total of 29 times," including four stab wounds that 
penetrated her skull and two that "went all the way through her skull." (PSI, p.7.) 
Elizabeth was left with an eight inch knife "lodged in her head." (PSI, p.7.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Culley pied guilty to second degree murder 
and the state dismissed the remaining charges and agreed not to file charges on 
"some burglaries and thefts" that Culley disclosed to law enforcement. (R., pp.102-
103; 10/9/2013 Tr., pp.1-15) There was no agreement limiting the state's sentencing 
recommendation. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.2, Ls.19-21.) As part of the plea agreement, 
Culley waived his rights to "file a motion to reduce or amend [his] sentence pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 35," and "to file a motion to withdraw [his] plea once a 
plea has been entered." (Plea Agreement, p.4 (exhibit to PSI), attached hereto as 
Appendix A.) 
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to sentencing, Culley withdraw his guilty plea. 
asserted his "guilty plea was not made knowingly and 
"the medication he was on at the time of the guilty plea and leading up to the guilty 
plea," and that he "was threatened by other inmates that he would suffer physical 
harm if he did not accept a plea deal." (R, pp.118-120.) The court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Culley's motion after which it entered a written order denying 
Culley's request to withdraw his guilty plea. (R, pp.127-128 (court minutes of 
hearing), 130-141 (memorandum decision denying motion, attached hereto as 
Appendix B).) 
Following a lengthy sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified life 
sentence with 45 years fixed. (R, pp.145-150 (court minutes), 154-155 Uudgment).) 
Culley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.161-163.) 
2 
ISSUES 
states issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Culley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of life, with 45 years fixed, following Mr. Culley's plea of 
guilty to second degree murder? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to consider his claim that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Culley waived his 
right to withdraw his plea as part of his plea agreement? Alternatively, has Culley 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for withdrawal of 
his guilty plea? 
2. Has Culley failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 





This Court Should Decline To Consider Culley's Claim That The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion By Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Because 
Culley Waived His Right To File Such A Motion As Part Of His Plea Agreement; 
Alternatively, Culley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion 
A. Introduction 
Culley argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-12.) This Court should 
decline to consider Culley's argument because, by the terms of his plea agreement, 
Culley waived his right to file such a motion. Alternatively, Culley has failed to show 
the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion. Application of the law 
to the record and the facts found by the district court supports the district court's 
determination that Culley failed to show he was entitled to withdraw his plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract law 
standards, and as a question of law, this Court exercises free review." State v. 
Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495,129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Waiver of a right as part of a plea 
agreement is reviewed using the same analysis employed "in determining the 
validity of any guilty plea." State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 
(1994). The waiver is enforceable if the record shows it was voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently made. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 
Idaho at 456, 872 P.2d at 719. 
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"Appellate review the of a motion withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-
781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings 
if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 
Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Culley Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived His Right To File A Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are generally reviewed using 
contract law standards. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, _, 336 P.3d 302, 305 (Ct. 
App. 2014) (citations omitted). "As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of 
unambiguous terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law 
to be decided by the court." & ( citing State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-411, 64 
P.3d 335, 336-337 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
Pursuant to the plain language of his plea agreement, Culley waived, without 
any express or implied limitation, his "right to withdraw [his] plea once a plea has 
been entered." (Appendix A, p.4.) Culley entered his guilty plea on October 9, 
2013. (See generally Tr., pp.1-15.) More than four months later, on February 28, 
2014, Culley moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.118-120.) Culley's motion 
was precluded by his plea agreement, and the district court should have declined to 
consider it. 
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appeal, Culley does 
generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-1 
the validity of his waiver. (See 
Instead, he dismisses effect waiver 
because "the district court decided the motion on the merits." (Appellant's Brief, p.2 
n.1.) That "the district court decided the motion on the merits" does not, however, 
preclude this Court from affirming the district court's decision on the basis of waiver. 
See, ~' State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 346, 256 P.3d 750, 754 (2011) 
("Although the district court held that Kirsch had actual authority to consent to the 
home search, we decline to address this issue and affirm on the alternative grounds 
that the warrant was justified by apparent authority."). 
Because Culley waived his right to request withdrawal of his guilty plea, and 
because he does not challenge the validity of that waiver on appeal, this Court 
should affirm based on Culley's waiver. 
D. Even If This Court Reviews The District Court's Decision Denying Culley's 
Motion To Withdraw His Plea, Despite Culley's Waiver Of The Right To File 
Such A Motion, Culley Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Culley's claim that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Culley has 
failed to show the district court abused its discretion. Culley claims otherwise, 
arguing "his long-term drug abuse, and the drugs he was on at the time of his plea, 
limited his memory of the offense," but he has since "remember[ed]" he is not guilty. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Culley also contends his plea was involuntary because, he 
claims, "he was threatened with bodily harm if he did not plead guilty." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.5.) 
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A a plea is governed 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when 
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of 
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. State v. Hanslovan, 
147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). Rather, "the defendant has 
the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted). Where, as in this case, the 
defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing but after he has 
"learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the 
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the 
defendant's apparent motive." State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 
969 (2008) (citing State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 
2004)). Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even absent 
prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal. Mayer, 139 
Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583. "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the 
defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for 
the trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations 
omitted). 
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'The first step a motion to withdraw a plea is to determine 
the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Hanslovan, 
147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). This step involves a three-part inquiry: (1) 
whether Culley understood the nature of the charges and whether he was coerced; 
(2) whether Culley "knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself," and (3) whether 
Culley understood the consequences of his guilty plea. State v. Anderson, 156 
Idaho 230, 234, 322 P.3d 312, 316 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). "On appeal, 
Idaho law requires that voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be 
reasonably inferred from the record as a whole." Js;L A review of Culley's plea 
colloquy and the record support the district court's finding that Culley's guilty plea 
was constitutionally valid. 
The written plea agreement, which Culley signed, states that Culley was 
charged with first degree murder, grand theft, and burglary, but he would plead guilty 
to an amended charge of second degree murder and the state would dismiss the 
grand theft and burglary charges. (Appendix A, p.3.) At the guilty plea hearing, 
Culley acknowledged he signed the written plea agreement, and when asked if he 
understood what was going to happen, Culley responded: "I'm pleading guilty to 
second degree murder."1 (10/9/2013 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-11.) The court advised Culley of 
1 The court also indicated it reviewed Culley's Guilty Plea Advisory Form and Culley 
agreed that he "went through" that form with his attorney. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-
14.) Although the written plea agreement is included in the record as an attachment 
to the PSI, it appears the Guilty Plea Advisory Form is not part of the record on 
appeal. Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605 n.5, 329 P.3d 380, 387 n.5 (Ct. App. 
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the maximum penalties for second degree murder, and reiterated that, under the 
terms of the plea agreement, the state was not limited in its sentencing 
recommendation; Culley indicated he understood. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.6, 
L.2; see Appendix A, p.3.) Culley also said he understood that, regardless of any 
recommendations, the court could "impose the maximum penalty." (10/9/2013 Tr., 
p.6, Ls.3-10.) 
Culley also acknowledged the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The 
written plea agreement states that Culley's attorney explained his constitutional 
rights and that, if Culley pied not guilty, he would be entitled to a "speedy and public 
jury trial by an impartial jury" where the state would have the burden of proving his 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and at which he would have the right to remain 
silent, to confront the witnesses against him, and to compulsory process to obtain 
witnesses and evidence in his defense. (Appendix A, p.2.) The Guilty Plea Advisory 
Form that Culley initialed and reviewed with his attorney also listed the rights he was 
waiving by pleading guilty, including the rights to a jury trial, to present a defense, 
andtoconfronthisaccusers. (10/9/2013Tr., p.4, Ls.11-23, p.6, L.11-p.7, L.11.) 
With respect to coercion, the written plea agreement Culley signed includes 
the following representation: "My decision to plead guilty is made freely and 
voluntarily. I have not been induced to plead guilty by any force, coercion, pressure, 
or fear." (Appendix A, p.2 1[ 6.) The written agreement and the colloquy also 
addressed whether Culley was under the influence of any substance. Specifically, in 
2014) ("missing portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the 
trial court"). 
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agreement, signed by represented that he was "not under 
the any substance, such as a narcotic or alcohol, that would affect [his] 
ability to understand the nature and consequences of [his] action in entering a guilty 
plea." (Appendix A, p.4 ,-i 13.) Then, during the colloquy, the following exchange 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Okaf Well, now, Mr. Culley, do you -- it 
indicates on this document[ ] that you suffer from a bipolar disorder, 
ADHD, and you're taking some medication for those conditions. Is that 
true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do those disorders prevent you from thinking 
clearly today or understanding the proceedings? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you think you can understand what's going 
on just fine? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And the medication you're taking does that affect 
your ability to think or reason or understand what's going on today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: So as you sit here today you feel clearheaded 
and have the ability to go forward voluntarily? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(10/9/2013 Tr., p.8, L.10- p.9, L.4.) 
The district court found Culley's response to its questions "were clear, 
coherent, and deliberate." (R., p.135 (Appendix 8).) In addition, as noted by the 
2 Presumably the district court is referring to the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, which, 
as noted, is not included in the record on appeal. 
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district court, Culley underwent a psychological evaluation and the evaluator 
determined Culley understood the charges against him and the consequences of his 
guilty plea. (R, p.137 (Appendix 8).) 
Culley's representations on the signed written plea agreement and the Guilty 
Plea Advisory Form, and his statements during his plea colloquy demonstrate his 
guilty plea was constitutionally valid. The district court correctly concluded as much. 
(R., p.138 (Appendix B) ("Based on the evidence from the record of the defendant's 
entry of plea and the psychological evaluations conducted by Dr. Ward, this Court 
finds that the defendant's entry of plea complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 11.").) 
Culley has failed to demonstrate this conclusion is erroneous. 
"If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine whether 
there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 
at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Culley 
asserted "the medication he was on at the time of the guilty plea and leading up to 
the guilty plea prevented him from making an intelligent and knowledgeable 
decision" and "threats from other inmates resulted in [him] entering a plea of guilty 
that was coerced and not voluntary." (R., pp.119-120.) In support of his motion, 
Culley submitted two affidavits. (Augmentation.) In his first affidavit, Culley averred: 
During the change of plea, this Honorable Court asked me if 
anyone had made any threats to me that would cause me to plead 
guilty and I responded, no. 
In truth other inmates threatened me, that I could suffer physical 
harm while in jail or prison and I would suffer physical harm if I testified 
against the codefendant and did not take a plea deal. 
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Later, while handcuffed within the Payette jail being 
escorted by a Payette Deputy, an inmate struck me causing a 
laceration face breaking glasses. 
On my current medication I am thinking more clear and I believe 
that there are facts that would cause a jury to find me not guilty of the 
offense charged. 
(Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw, filed February 28, 2014 
(augmentation).) 
In his second affidavit, Culley identified John Riggs as the person who 
allegedly told him "to plead guilty and not testify against the codefendant or else 
[Culley] would suffer physical harm." (Second Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support 
of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.1, filed March 13, 2014 (augmentation).) In 
addition, Culley stated he still believed Riggs' "threats to be credible," but claimed he 
"no longer [felt] compelled to plead guilty." (Id., p.1.) Culley also alleged that since 
he pied guilty his medications were changed and he now "remember[s] more facts of 
the case that [he] believe[s] will show [he is] not guilty of the crimes charged." (Id., 
p.2.) 
As Culley acknowledged in his first affidavit, his claim of coercion is 
contradicted by the representations he made when he pied guilty. Further, the 
factual basis of his coercion claim was controverted by the state at the hearing on 
Culley's motion. Clarence Costner, the jail commander for the Payette County 
Sherriff's Office, testified that the jail maintains records of incidences between 
inmates. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.1.) Commander Costner reviewed 
Culley's records, which reflected two incidents involving Culley - one between 








The incident between Culley and Naughton occurred sometime before August 2013, 
and the incident involving Palmoares was August 22, 2013. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.24, L.8 
- p.25, L.2.) There was no record of any other fights involving Culley, including no 
record of an altercation between Culley and Riggs. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.27, L.23 -
p.28, L.9; see p.30, Ls.7-13.) Moreover, there was no evidence that the altercations 
in which Culley was involved were in any way related to the murder charge pending 
against him. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.35, L.10 - p.36, L.7, p.39, L.18 - p.40, L.5.) On this 
point, the district court specifically found the evidence did not "support a finding that 
the reported incidents were related to this particular case." (R., p.140 (Appendix B).) 
The district court also noted the following testimony from Commander 
Costner: 
Payette County Jail Commander, Clarence Costner, testified 
that he had received no information that the defendant and Riggs had 
ever gotten into an argument or had an altercation. He stated that 
Riggs and the codefendant, Hernandez, were housed together for a 
short time, but according to Costner, Riggs left the Payette County Jail 
and went to prison in April 2013. This was five months prior to Culley's 
guilty plea. It is hard to believe that any threat made by Riggs over five 
months earlier continued to haunt the defendant. Furthermore, co-
defendant Hernandez had changed his plea to guilty in August, 2013, 
approximately six weeks prior to Culley's plea of guilty. So at the time 
of the guilty plea, there was never a necessity to testify against co-
defendant Hernandez. 
(R., p.140 (Appendix B).) 
Based on the evidence presented, the district court found Culley's guilty plea 
was not coerced by "threats of physical harm." (R. p.140 (Appendix B).) This 




conclusion. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp Instead, 
"despite the actual physical attack [by Palomares], district 
court found there was 'no evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant was 
coerced into pleading guilty by threats of physical harm."' (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
This assertion does not establish clear error in the district court's finding because 
there was, in fact, no evidence that the altercation with Palomares was related to the 
pending murder charge, nor did Culley present any evidence of specific threats. The 
only evidence was to the contrary. Culley's claim of error fails. 
In support of the second reason Culley offered in support of his motion, Culley 
presented the testimony of Dr. Clay Ward. (3/13/2014 Tr., pp.4-20.) Dr. Ward 
testified that he visited with Culley "within the past week" to "evaluat[e] for any 
changes in his mental state and his memory of events, his clinical presentation." 
(3/13/2014 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-22.) Dr. Clay previously met with Culley on December 31, 
2013, and January 18, 2014. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.5, L.23- p.6, L.1.) Dr. Ward testified 
that when he met with Culley in December and January, Culley was "cooperative" 
with "some delay in his processing speed" and "some gaps in his memory," but "his 
thinking was logical and coherent." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-13.) However, when 
Dr. Ward met with Culley in the "past week," Culley's "speech was more pressured" 
and "more rapid," his "thought processes were somewhat more loose ... in the 
sense ... there was some illogical portions" and Culley was "at times ... almost 
delusional" and had "magical sort of thinking." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-23.) Dr. 
Ward also described Culley as "more animated" and "thinking more quickly." 
(3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.23-24.) Comparing Culley's most recent behavior with what 
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observed in January, Dr. Vvard quickness of what was 
was positive but the illogical it or the almost delusional it," was 
"definitely" "negative." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.6.) Dr. Ward also noted 
that Culley "was able to provide a lot more details" and his "memory component was 
improved." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.7-10.) 
Following cross-examination, the district court asked Dr. Ward if he reviewed 
the records or was aware of the medications Culley was taking on or about October 
9, 2013, which was the date Culley pied guilty. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.19, Ls.15-17.) Dr. 
Ward responded, "No, I'm not." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.19, L.18.) 
The district court discussed Culley's "change in medication" argument and 
stated that it could not "conclude that [Culley's] mental condition has improved. To 
the contrary, his mental condition apparently is less coherent today than when Dr. 
Ward evaluated him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014." (R., p.141 
(Appendix B).) The district court further found that the evidence "does not support a 
conclusion that the medication [Culley] was taking on October 9, 2013 had any effect 
on his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary entry of plea." (R., p.141 
(Appendix B).) 
On appeal, Culley claims the district court's "finding ignores a critical 
consideration; even if [his] thinking was not as coherent, Dr. Ward said at two points 
that [his] memory was actually better." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) As evidence of his 
improved memory, Culley relies on Exhibit 1, which the state presented at the 
hearing on Culley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.63, L.15 -
p.65, L.6.) Exhibit 1 is a letter Culley wrote to his grandfather, which is dated March 
15 
5, 2014. (Exhibit 1, p.1; see 3/13/2014 Tr., p.63, Ls.22-24.) According to Culley, 
Exhibit 1 "makes it clear that [he] was remembering more detail that may have led to 
an acquittal for murder." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Although neither of Culley's 
affidavits identify the new details demonstrating his innocence that Culley 
supposedly remembered, it appears from the testimony presented at the hearing on 
his motion that the new details involved him having a hammer that he was 
supposedly going to throw at Hernandez, but Hernandez threatened him with a gun 
before saying, "You are either with me or your [sic] not." (Exhibit 1, pp.2-3; 
3/13/2014 Tr., p.65, L.11 - p.67, L.B.) Culley's new memory about a hammer and a 
gun do not constitute a just reason to withdraw his plea. 
As noted in the district court's order, Culley has always claimed that 
Hernandez made the "you are with me or you're not" statement. (R., pp.136-138 
(Appendix B).) And, Dr. Ward testified that Culley has "always admitted that he 
stabbed [Elizabeth]." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.68, Ls.22-23.) Even in his letter, he writes 
(verbatim), in relevant part: 
I nelt over my aunt she was barely breathing I felt a jab from the curtain 
rods Johnny had picked up my glasses flew off I stabbed my aunt 
multiple times till she stoped gurgaling Johnny punched me and told 
me to stop crying I found my glasses and then thought about my aunt 
suffering till my mom got home I stabed her in the head and drove the 
knife into her brain so she would not suffer I then picked up myself we 
found the keys and I yelled my mom will be here any second 
(Exhibit 1, p.3.) 
While Culley claims he remembered details that show his innocence, he 
presented no evidence of such. Even if Culley believes he has some unarticulated 
reasons for proclaiming his innocence, despite the evidence to the contrary, "[a] 
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mere assertion of innocence, itself, is not grounds to withdraw a guilty plea." 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at (citations . "[S]o long as a 
factual basis for the plea exists, the court may accept a tactical guilty plea even from 
a defendant who continues to assert his innocence." kt Culley provided a factual 
basis for his guilty plea, his attorney agreed a factual basis exists, and the district 
court correctly rejected Culley's claim that he should be entitled to withdraw that plea 
based on his change of medication and new memories. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.13, L.16-
p.15, L.24; R., pp.140-141 (Appendix B).) 
Culley has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea given that the plea was constitutionally valid and 
Culley offered no just reason to withdraw it. 
11. 
Culley Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Culley contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
sentencing. More specifically, Culley argues his sentence "is not necessary to 
achieve the goals of sentencing." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Culley is incorrect. The 
district court acted well within its discretion and consistent with the objectives of 
sentencing in imposing a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed for Culley's 
involvement in the brutal murder of his aunt, Elizabeth Baune. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
In order demonstrate an abuse the court's 
Culley must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence 
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility 
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Culley cannot meet his burden in this 
case. 
In imposing sentence, the district court recited the objectives of sentencing 
and indicated it "looked at each one of these factors." (Sent. Tr., p.193, Ls.18-23.) 
The court then outlined its sentencing rationale in detail, addressing each objective. 
(Sent. Tr., p.193, L.23-p.199, L.12.) 
On appeal, Culley claims "[t]here are several mitigating factors that illustrate 
why [his] sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Culley identifies those factors as his "severe mental health 
issues as a result of his abusive childhood," his long history of drug abuse, his 
history of sexual abuse, and his young age when he murdered is aunt. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.12-17.) All of this information was, however, before the district court and 
considered by the court in imposing sentence, and none of the information compels 
a lower sentence. That Culley disagrees with how the district court weighed the 
evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing does not show an abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In 
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case, Windom essentially asks this to re-weigh the evidence presented to 
district and reach a different conclusion ... our is 
reweigh the evidence considered by the district court; our role is to determine 
whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district 
court."). 
Based on the nature of the offense, Culley's character, and the objectives of 
sentencing, a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed is not excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Culley's judgment of 
conviction for second degree murder. 
DATED this 2?1h day of February, 2015. 
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J · SSICA M. LORELLO 
Jeputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASENO.: CR-2012-2423 
Plaintiff, ) 
) PLEA AGREEMENT 
v. ) 
) 
MICHAEL JOSEPH CULLEY, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
1. I, MICHAEL JOSEPH CULLEY, the Defendant in the above referenced matter, have 
been informed by my attorney and in open couit on this date of my constitutional rights in 
the above entitled case, and I have read and fully understand the following: 
2. I understand that this plea agreement reflects the entire agreement reached by the parties 
. and stipulate to it being made a part of the record in this matter. I FURTIIER 
UNDERSTAND THAT THE JUDGE IS NOT BOUND BY THE SENTENCING 
RECOMMENDATION. 
3. I have received and read a copy of all paits of the Information or Indictment in this matter 
and I understand the nature of the charges that have been made against me. I have 
discussed the same with my attorney and 1 have told my attorney all I lmow about the 
matters ref erred to in it. 
Plea Agreement 1 
has explained"my' constitutional figlits,"·and 'the pur1ishme11t 
imposed by the court upon my plea of guilty, 
5. I understand that ifI plead not guilty to any count or counts in the Information or 
Indictment, the following will occur: 
a. I would be presumed im1ocent of the charges against me in such count or 
counts; 
b. I would be entitled to a speedy and public jury trial by an impartial jury in 
which the burden would be upon the State to establish my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all twelve (12) jurors; and 
c. Upon such trial 1) I would be entitled to remain silent and no inference could 
be drawn against me because of my silence; 2) I could, if I wished, testify on 
my own behalf; 3) I would be entitled to confront and cross~examine all 
witnesses against me; 4) I would be entitled to compulsory process of the 
court to obtain witnesses and evidence to be offered in my defense. 
6. My decision to plead guilty is made freely and voluntarily. I have not been induced to 
plead guilty by any force, coercion, pressure, or fear. 
7. If I am not a naturalized citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of 
factual admissions could have consequences of depo1tation, exclusion of admission to the 
United States, or denial of naturalization. 
8. I understand the following conditions apply to this plea agreement: 
a. At sentencing, the State is free to discuss the contents of the pre sentence 
investigation and to facilitate victim impact statements. 
Plea Agreement 2 
scheduled and upon appearing at sentencing as scheduled by the court. If I fail to 
appear at any scheduled hearing, the sentencing and/or plea agreement may be 
withdrawn by the State. 
c. Titls offer is contingent upon my having only the prior cdminal history reflected 
in the State's Response for Discovery. IfI fail to disclose criminal history not 
reflected in the State's response or if prior criminal convictions are later 
discovered, the sentencing and/or plea agreement may be withdrawn by the State. 
9. I am currently charged with Count I - MURDER IN TH:ii: Fill.ST DEGREE ( Felony), 
Count II - GRAND THEFT BY RECEMNG/POSSESSING STOLEN PROPERTY 
( Felony) and Count ID - BURGLARY ( Felony). I understand that, upon pleading 
guilty to the amended charge - Count I of Murder in the 2nd Degree (Felony) in Case 
No. CR-2012-2423, the following will occur: 
Plea Agreement 3 
a. At sentencing, the Prosecuting Attorney will dismiss Counts II and III 
of the Amended Indictment, 
b. At sentencing, the State will recommend penalties as follows: 
sentencing will be open ended, 
c. I understand I will be required to pay restitution on all charges 
herein, in the amount of $2000 to ISP Forensics. $5781.44 to the 
Crime Victims Compensation Program. $19,729 to Oregon Mutual 





Baune: $374.82' to Wayne Buxton~- TBD cleaning 
Passport and Cricut Die-Cut which may be in the Honda Passport. 
d. Restitution will be joint and several with Jonathon Hernandez, Co-
Def endaut herein. 
oz.u.,...~1:1,,,.,.,.J ~l'\~v..:,,. ~f~res.{11--vd--r~ ti,.___ (>fo ot..t:11_> 1>'l-l::,B'1( 1°-n-!>'b~I 
e. If the public defender was appointed to represent me, the State will 1 ·1- ! 1 oSS' 8 
Ct/kl f-3. ~ /¥2.1$ 
request reimbursement to the County in an amount consistent with f:h tl. r-r~s wi/l 
Administrative Ordel' 2000-1. 
/1DJ... ~ f?Q.J. ' 
'((\ v 
I am not bound by this sentencing l'ecommendation and may argue for a lesser sentence. 
I am bound by the above restitution amount and may not object and/or appeal said 
restitution amount. 
I 0. In exchange for the above terms, I agree as follows: 
a. To waive my right to file a motion to reduce or amend my sentence pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 35; and 
b. To waive my right to file a motion to withdraw my plea once a plea has been 
entered. 
11. I have discussed all the elements of this plea agreement ,v:itb my lawyer and he or she has 
explained every detail of the plea agreement to me to my satisfaction. · 
12. I am satisfied with my lawyers representation of me in this matter and do not believe he 
or she is incompetent or apathetic to the outcome of my case. 
13. I am not under the influence of any substance, such as a narcotic 01· alcohol, that would 
affect my ability to understand the nature and consequences ofmy action in entering a 
guilty plea. 
Plea Agreement 4 
"/Vt-}rl- I 
14. I understand that plea negotiatforis recognize the economic considerations of limited 
prosecutorial resources. I understand that the State does not punish a citizen for 
asserting the right to a jury trial, but the State makes concessions as to charging and/or 
sentencing recommendations in exchange for a swift and certain resolution of a case. 
15. Finally, I understand that the Judge is not bound or obligated to follow the sentencing 
recommendations of the prosecutor when detennining what sentence he or she will 
impose and is free to impose whatever sentence he or she deems just and fit. 
Dated this .!I__ day of October, 2013. 
~-~ 
MICffAli' JOSEPH CULLEY 
Defendant 
I, Matthew J. Roker, the attorney for the above named defendant, have reviewed the 
foregoing with and have explained to Michael Joseph Culley the nature of the charges against him, 
his constitutional rights and the punishment that could be imposed upon his guilty plea. 
Plea Agreett1ent 5 
n~LR£-
Matthew J. Rokep' 1 
Attorney for Defendant 
Offered this ·sth offer is open only on 





/ Barbara J. Richart 
Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attomey 
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CASE NO. CR 2012-2423 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
UPON MOTION TO WITIIDRA W 
GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 33(c) 
The above-captioned case came on for hearing on March 13, 2014 upon Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw Gtilty Plea. The State was represented by Anne-Marie Kelso and Barbara 
Richart, Payette County Prosecuting Attorneys. The defendant was represented by bis attorney, 
Matthew J. Roker. The Court has considered the briefing, the testimony and exhibits admitted at the 
hearing, and oral arguments presented by counsel, and hereby finds as follows. 
PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 
On November 19, 2012, the Grand Jury of Payette County returned an Indictment against 
the defendant charging him with Murder in the First Degree, Gmnd Theft by Possession of Stolen 
Property, and Burglary. 
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On October 9, 2013, a change of plea hearing was held. The State filed an Amended 
Indictment charging :Michael Culley with the felony offense of Murder in the Second Degree in 
Count I, and the felony offense of Grant Theft by Receiving Stolen Property in Count II, and the 
felony offense of Burglary in Count III. At that time, a written agreement pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 11 was also filed with the Court that set forth an agreement that the State would 
dismiss Counts II and m of the Amended Indictment in exchange for a plea of guilty to Count I, 
Murder in the Second Degree. Mr. Roker verbally delineated the Rule 11 agreement for the record. 
The defendant was swam in by the clerk and questioned by the Court regarding his understanding 
of the plea agreement In addition, the Court reviewed with the defendant the guilty plea advisory 
form, Appendix A to the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
The defendant mtered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of Murder in the Second Degree. 
The Court concluded from interviewing the defendant that there was a factual basis for his plea. 
The Court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) and appointed a psychologist to report 
upon the defendant's mental condition pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. The PSI was completed and 
forwarded to the Court and counsel on November 21, 2013. The report of the defendant's mental 
condition was received on or about January 31, 2014. The sentencing is sche~uled for March 26-
28, 2014. 
On February 28. 2014, the defendant, by and through his attorney, Matthew J. Roker, filed a 
Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty Pursuant to ICR 33(c). The stated reasons for the motion were 
that the guilty plea was not made knowingly and intelligently and that Defeµdant was threatened by 
other inmates that he would suffer physical harm if he did not accept a plea deal. In affidavits, the 
defendant Michael Cu11ey asserts that an inmate whose name Culley recalls to be John Riggs 
threatened him with physical harm if he testified against his codefendant, Jonathon Hernandez and 
did not take the plea deal. The defendant also stated in his affidavit that following his guilty plea, 
another inmate struck lim in the face breaking his glasses and causing a laceration above his eye. 
Lastly, the defendant states that his current medication allows him to think more clearly and that he 
now recalls more facts about the case that he believes will show that he is not guilty. 
On March 11, 2014, the State filed an Objection to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
The State argues that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, that he appeared 
reasonably calm and clear-headed and that he repeatedly assured the Court that he understood the 
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LAW & ANALYSIS 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas and states in full: 
( c) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty lllllY be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition 
of sentance is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court 
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit 
the defandant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
I.C.R. 33(c). 
As provided in State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. 
App. 2008): 
The granting or denial of such a motion is within the discretion of 
the trial court. State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (CtApp.1990). When the motion is made before the 
pronouncement of sentence, such discretion should be liberally 
exercised. Id Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court 
and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight 
as compered to protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. 
State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 415, 816 P.2d 364, 3 71 
(Ct.App.1991). Presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right;. the defendant has the burden of showing a "just 
reason" exists to withdraw the plea. State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 
285, 289, 787 P.2d 271, 275 (1990); State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 
72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (CtApp.2000); State v. McFarland, 130 
Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (CtApp.1997). 
In Hanslovan, the Court of Appeals outlined the steps for analyzing a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea as follows: 
The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to 
determine whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310. 
If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine 
whether fl.ere are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea. 
Id; see also State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 
(1993); Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. This just reason 
standard does not require that the defendant establish a 
constitutional defect in the guilty plea. Id,· State v. Henderson, 113 
Idaho 411, 413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct.App.1987). Once the 
defendant has met this burden, the state may avoid withdrawal of 
the plea by demonstrating the existence of prejudice. Dopp, 124 
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Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 
392. 
Additionally, the scope of the trial court's discretion is affected by the timing of the 
motion. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct App. 2004). The Court of 
Appeals in Mayer explained the following: 
Where the motion is filed before sentencing, the defendant need 
only show a 'Just reason" for withdrawing the plea. but after 
sentenckig, the plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 
P.2d 11S1, 1153 (1988); State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512, 516, 861 
P.2d 81., 86 (Ct.App.1992). This distinction in the standards is 
utilized to avoid encouraging defendants to plead guilty in order 
to test the potential punishment and then withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (CtApp.1997); State v. Freeman, 
110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (CtApp.1986). Even when 
the motion is presented before sentencing, if it occurs after the 
defendant has learned the content of the presentence report or has 
received other information about the probable sentence, the court 
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent 
motive. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367 
(CtApp.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d 
162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A defendant's failure to present and 
support a plausible reason will dictate against granting 
withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. Dopp, 124 
Idaho at 516, 861 P.2d at 86; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 
P.2d at 1310. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Was the defen•ant's guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made? 
To detennine whether a plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the 
Court must examine the record to determine: 
(1) Whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he 
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) 
whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from 
incrimimting himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood 
the consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568,572,249 P.3d 367, 371 (2011) citing Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484, 
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On October 9, 2013, the defendant entered his guilty plea open court on the At 
that hearing, the Coort placed the defendant under oath and questioned him as to his 
understanding of the :Rule 11 agreement. 
[COURT]: Mr. Culley, first of all, why don't you just repeat for 
me what you understand is going to happen today. 
[CULLEY]: I'm pleading guilty to second degree murder. 
[COURT]: And you understood that Counts II and III of the 
Amended Indictment would be dismissed? 
[CULLEY]: Yeah. Yes. 
[COURT]: And what else do you understand?. 
[CULLEY]: That's it 
[COURT]: As far as you know, that's the full agreement? 
[CULLEY]: Yeah. 
The Court askoo if the defendant understood the plea agreement and asked if it was his 
signature on the plea agreement The Court then asked if the defendant understood the guilty 
plea advisory form and asked if it was his signature on the form. The defendant stated that he 
understood the plea agreement and the explanations and questions on the guilty plea advisory 
form, and that it was his signature thereon. He also stated that he went over both documents with 
his attorney before court on October 9, 2013. 
According to the record, the Court asked the following: 
[COUR11: Now with these documents, what we're trying to do is 
do our best to explain to you what rights you have, what rights you 
might be waiving if you enter a plea of guilty, and also try to 
explain to you the possible penalties that could be imposed. Do 
you understand that? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
The Court went on to explain the maximum penalty for the offense of Murder in the 
Second Degree was life in the state penitentiary, including a mandatory minimum period of ten 
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years. In addition, Mr. Roker stated that he went over mandatory period of ten (10) 
years with his client. The Court also stated that it was not required to follow either the sentence 
recommendations of the State or defendant's counsel and that the Court could impose the 
maximum period of incarceration of life in prison. The defendant stated that he understood the 
possible penalty. 
The Court referred to the explanations in the guilty plea advisory form regarding the 
rights that the defendant would be waiving if he were to plead guilty and asked, "Did you put 
your initials there to signify that you read and understood what was explained?" The defendant 
responded, "Yes." 
At the October 9, 2013 hearing, the defendant's responses were clear, coherent, and 
deliberate. The following exchange illustrates the defendant's articulate responses and his 
understanding of the plea agreement and the Court's questions: 
[COURT]: Did you have trouble reading or understanding these 
questiom? 
[CULLBY]: No. 
[COURT]: Now, according to this, the highest grade you 
completed is the eighth grade. 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
[COURT]: So, I'm wondering, can you really read this? 
[CULLEY]: After eighth grade, I got my GED, went to Job Corp 
got my HSE and completed a trade, so yes. 
[COURT]: So you didn't have any problem with this? 
[CULLEY]: No. 
The Court also asked Mr. Roker if he noticed if the defendant had any inability to 
understand or read the English language. Mr. Roker said that he did not. Mr. Roker explained 
that the defendant had a question regarding reserving his right to appeal any pre-trial issues but 
that he explained to the defendant that those motions are filed prior to trial and none were filed in 
this case. 
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Then., the Court asked if it was correct that the defendant suffered from 
and Attention Deficit Disorder and asked ifhe was currently on medication for those conditions. 
The defendant stated that that was correct. The Court asked whether those disorders prevented 
him from thinking clearly or understanding the proceedings that day. The defendant responded, 
''No." 
[COURT]: And, the medication you're taking. Does that affect your ability to 
think or reason or understand what's going on today? 
[CULLEY]: No. 
[COURT]: So as you sit here today, you feel clear-headed and 
have the ability to go forward voluntarily? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
The Court also asked whether the defendant had plenty of time to speak with his attorney 
and whether he was satisfied with his legal advice. The defendant said, "Yes." 
The Court read the Amended Indictment including each of the required elements for a 
finding of Murder in Second Degree and asked, "To that charge, do you plead guilty?" The 
defendant clearly stated, "Yes." The Court then asked that the defendant explain, in his own 
words, what he did to be guilty of that offense. 
The defendant provided the court with a factual basis for his plea. In his plea colloquy, 
he stated that he and Jonathon Hernandez went to the home of Elizabeth Baune with the intention 
to steal money or credit cards. Ms. Baune was home sleeping but that she woke up. The Court 
asked, "So you were sneaking in her room trying to not wake her?" The defendant stated, ''No. 
In the house. She was in her room and she woke up." The defendant said, "She came out. She 
started yelling at Johnny, Johnny yelled back. He stabbed her and then kept stabbing her and 
then handed me the knife and said, 'You with me or without me?' and then handed me the knife 
and I stabbed her." Then., the Court repeated what the defendant said and asked if that was 
correct 
[COURT]: Did you witness Mr. Hernandez stabbing her? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
[COURT]: And you did nothing? 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO ICR 33(C) Page7 
• 
[CULLEY]: 
[COURT]: And then, Mr. Hernandez, as I understand you, said 
'either you're with me or not with me' and handed you the knife? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
[COURT]: And what did you do? 
[CULLEY]: I stabbed Elizabeth Baune. 
[COURT]: In what part of her body? 
[CULLEY]: Umm, back and chest. 
[COURT]: And, it could have been any one of those stab wounds 
that may have caused her death? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
[COURT]: Do you understand that? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
[COUR1]: Are you pleading guilty today because you believe 
your stab wound could have been the fatal blow? 
[CULLEY]: Yes. 
The Court then asked Mr. Roker, after reviewing all of the evidence and reports, if he 
was satisfied that the Court had a factual basis to accept the defendant's plea. Mr. Roker 
responded, "Yes." 
In addition to the record of defendant's guilty plea, the Court reviewed Dr. Clay H. 
Ward's psychological evaluation of the defendant. Dr. Ward conducted evaluations of the 
defendant on December 31, 2013 and on January 18, 2014. With regard to the defendant's 
mental capacity, Dr. Ward provides the following in his report on page one: 
Michael Culley has a good understanding of the charges against 
him. He has a good understanding of the consequences of his 
guilty plea and there did not appear to be any significant issues 
related to his competency to assist in his defense. He agreed to 
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participate in the evaluation without any stated reservations. He 
also appeared competent to agree to participate in this evaluation. 
Additionally, Dr. Ward's psychological evaluation provides the defendant's description 
of his participation in the murder of Elizabeth. Baune. Notably, the description given to Dr. 
Ward in his evaluations on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014 is the same description of 
the crime that formed the factual basis for his plea of guilty on October 9, 2013. It is also 
consistent with the confession he gave to police on November 9, 2012. See Transcript of Grand 
Jury Proceedings November 19, 2012 (pg. 28-30). 
The record indicates that this Court. the defendant, and his counsel, had lengthy 
discussions regarding the plea agreement on October 9, 2013. The defendant testified under oath 
when he entered his plea that: (1) he understood the charges and possible consequences of 
pleading guilty; (2) he discussed the case with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney's 
performance; (3) he understood that he was giving up his right to trial; and ( 4) understood the 
entirety of the plea agreement The record from October 9, 2013 reveals that the defendant's 
responses are clear, coherent, and articulate. At times during the entry of his plea, he even 
interjects to assure the Court that he has completed his GED and HSE and that he read and 
understood the plea agreement Additionally, Dr. Ward's psychological evaluation provides the 
Court with evidence tmt the defendant "has a good understanding of the charges against him" 
and "a good understanclng of the consequences ofhls guilty plea." 
Based on the evidence from the record of the defendant's entry of plea and the 
psychological evaluati<mS conducted by Dr. Ward, this Court finds that the defendant's entry of 
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that the defendant's entry of plea 
complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 11.1 
1 LC.R. ll(c) Acceptance of Plea ofGuilty.-Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire 
proceedings, including reBS(Xlable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: 
(1) The voluntariness of the plea. 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, 
and other direct consequences which may apply. 
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant. 
(4) The defendant was inforlled of the nature of the charge against the defendant. 
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining 
agreement, and if so, the natsre of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by 
any promises or recommemiwon from either party as to punishment 
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2. Whether the Defendant provided just reasons for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
The State correctly asserts that the defendant waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea 
based on the terms of the Rule 11 plea agreement. Ordinarily, the Court's analysis would end 
here as the defendant's plea was constitutionally valid and his rights were waived. However, this 
Court will analyze the defendant's proposed reasons as ifhe did not waive his right to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
After finding that the plea is constitutionally valid, the Court must then determine 
whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 
80 I P .2d at 1310. It is the defendant's burden to establish a just reason. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 
861 P.2d at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. Because the defendant filed his Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea prior to sentencing but after he received the presentence report, "the 
court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." State v. Johnson, 
120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 
P.2d 162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A defendant's failure to present and support a plausible reason will 
dictate against grantin1 withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 
516,861 P.2d at 86; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959,801 P.2d at 1310. Presentence withdrawal of a 
guilty plea is not an automatic right; the defendant has the burden of showing a ''just reasonn exists 
to withdraw the plea. State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 289, 787 P.2d 271, 275 (1990); State v. 
Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388,392 (Ct.App.2000); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 
941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct.App.1997). It is in the Court's discretion to determine whether the defendant 
satisfies the just reason standard. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310. 
In the first and second Affidavits of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea 
of Guilty, the defendant asserts two reasons for withdrawal of the plea: (1) another inmate 
threatened him and said that if he did not take the plea deal, he would suffer physical harm while in 
jail or prison if he testified against the codefendant, Jonathon Hernandez; and, (2) his current 
medication allows him to think more clearly and he believes there are facts that would cause a jury 
to find him not guilty. However, there is little, if any, evidence to support these claims. 
When the defeooant's guilty plea was taken on October 9, 2013, the district court asked if 
there had been any threats made to coerce him in any way into pleading guilty and the defendant 
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said, "No." Then, on February 28, 2014, the defendant contended that be was threatened other 
inmates to plead guilty. On March 13, 2014 in his Second Affidavit, the defendant provides 
name of John Riggs \\Ibo allegedly threatened him, but states that although he still believes the 
threats to be credible, he is no longer compelled to plead guilty because of any threats. 
Payette County Jail Commander, Clarence Costner, testified that he had received no 
information that the defendant and Riggs had ever gotten into an argument or had an altercation. He 
stated that Riggs and the codefendant, Hernandez, were housed together for a short time, but 
according to Costner, Riggs left the Payette County Jail and went to prison in April 2013. This was 
five months prior to Culley's guilty plea. It is hard to believe that any threat made by Riggs over 
five months earlier continued to haunt the defendant Furthermore, co-defendant Hernandez had 
changed his plea to guilty in August. 2013, approximately six weeks prior to Culley's plea of guilty. 
So at the time of the guilty plea, there was never a necessity to testify against co-defendant 
Hernandez. 
Costner did testify that there have been several incidences involving the defendant in the 
Payette County Jail. First, he stated that the defendant and his then-cellmate, Tyler Naughton, got 
into a verbal altercation and had to be separated sometime before August 2013. But he stated that 
there was nothing in the report that indicated that the altercation related to this particular case. 
Costner further testified about a physical altercation between the defendant and an inmate-
worker named Luis Palomares on August 22, 2013. Costner stated that after watching video of the 
incident, he observed what he believed to be a look of aggression given by Culley toward Palomares 
and Palomares punched the defendant in the face, cutting his eye and breaking his glasses. Costner 
testified that it was his opinion, based on the video, that the defendant instigated or "aggressed" 
Palomares by walking toward him. He also stated that there was nothing in the report that indicated 
that the altercation related to this particular case. 
The evidence before the Court does not support a finding that the reported incidents were 
related to this particular case. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the 
defendant was coerced into pleading guilty by threats of physical harm. 
As to the defendant's argument regarding a change in medication, Dr. Ward testified that 
during the interviews he conducted of the defendant on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014 
the defendant was coq,erative, showed "some delay in bis processing speed" but that his thinking 
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was logical and coherem. In the psychological evaluation, Dr. Ward wrote that the defendant "has a 
good understanding of the charges against him. He has a good understanding of the consequences 
of his guilty plea and there did not appear to be any significant issues related to his competency to 
assist in his defense." 
Dr. Ward was asked to revisit the defendant on March 10, 2014 to evaluate him for any 
changes in his mental state or memory of the events. Dr. Ward testified to the changes in the 
defendant's demeanor :iom the last time he met with him on January 18, 2014. Dr. Ward said that 
the defendant's speech was more pressured and rapid He also stated that during the March 10, 
2014 evaluation, the defendant was able to provide more details and that his memory appeared 
improved. However, he stated that the defendant's thought processes were "somewhat more loose 
in the sense that there was some illogical portions to it." He stated that at times during his March 10 
visit, the defendant had "delusional or magical sort of thinking" and that his thought processes 
"were not linear, they were not analytical." 
On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Ward· if he believed the defendant was doing 
worse now than when he met with him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014. Dr. Ward 
replied, "'In some ways. He's thinking quicker and his memory's improved but his thought 
processes are less coherent, less linear/' Based on that testimony, the Court cannot conclude that the 
defendant's mental condition has improved. To the contrary, his mental condition apparently is less 
coherent today than when Dr. Ward evaluated him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014. 
The evidence presented to the Court does not support a conclusion that the medication the 
defendant was taking on October 9, 2013 had any effect on his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary entry of plea 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does order that Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Plea of Guilty is DENIED. 
Dated this (1-lk day of Marc.( . 2014. 
~~D~tt 
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